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Abstract.   Using a multi-industry dataset of 228 firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) this paper 
analyses the effects of ownership structure and board characteristics on performance in large, publicly traded 
firms that are controlled by founding families. After taking account of possible endogeneity problems, we do 
not find that family control is associated with performance measured in terms of accounting ratios, sales per 
issued capital, earnings per share and market-to-book value. However, share ownership by institutional investors, 
and foreign financial institutions in particular, is associated with better performance. Our results indicate that 
board independence from founding family and board members’ financial interests have a positive impact on 
performance. 
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There is a growing body of research in the economics and management literatures that 
links general governance factors, such as the pattern and amount of stock ownership 
and board characteristics, with strategic decisions (e.g., Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Wan, 2003; 
Filatotchev, Buck, & Zhukov, 2000; Hambrick & Jackson, 2000; Hoskisson, Johnson, & 
Moesel, 1994), and, eventually, corporate performance (e.g., Cho, 1998; Dalton, Daily, 
Certo, & Roengpitya, 2003; Daily & Dalton, 1992; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Hansmann, 
1996). Despite this wealth of research, mainly grounded in an agency framework, little is 
known about ownership-performance inter-relationships outside Western, particularly the 
US, environments of widely-held public corporations (Bruton et al., 2003). More specifi- 
cally, there is a dearth of research on their determinants in family-controlled but publicly 
listed firms (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, & Makri, 2003), which represent a significant 
part of the corporate sector in many developed and developing countries (Chang, 2003; La 
Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). Daily, Dalton, and Rajagopalan (2003: 155) 
indicate “agency effects may function differently in this context and that prior findings from 
non-family samples may not readily generalize into this setting”. 
  
Family-controlled firms play a particularly important role in Asian countries (Chang, 
2003; Joh, 2003), but, with the exception of Japan, most studies of corporate governance 
related to Asian countries prior to 1998 rely on case study methods of specific industrial 
sectors (for example, Taniura, 1989, 1993; Numazaki, 1993). While many have produced 
interesting results the overall picture of corporate governance in the region remains am- 
biguous. More recently, the financial crisis in South East Asia has resulted in a plethora 
of research that has concentrated on the importance of models of corporate governance in 
countries that are largely organised through a system of family control and ownership of 
firms (e.g., Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003; Bruton et al., 2003; Carney & Gedajlovic, 
2003). These studies tend to focus on the impact of various forms of family ownership on 
firm performance, attributing corporate vulnerability to the degree of family involvement. 
However, a number of Asian countries did not experience a dramatic fall in economic per- 
formance during the crisis period, while still maintaining a close family ownership structure 
(Rajan & Zingales, 1998). This is not totally surprising, since the economic environment 
within countries of the region is substantially different, despite common elements such as 
cultural background, the nature and extent of institutions and the level of economic devel- 
opment. A single model of corporate governance for all Asia is unlikely although Mitton 
(2002) found that governance mechanisms, especially monitoring activity, are critical to 
corporate performance. However, to what extent this varies across individual countries is 
still unclear. Thus, this paper focuses on a single country, Taiwan. 
Taiwan is a model for newly emerging economies. Since WWII, high levels of economic 
development have been achieved, due largely to a national policy of promoting manufac- 
turing in the information technology sector. But, at the same time, excessive capital from 
trading surpluses and property appreciation in an immature and poorly regulated local mar- 
ket has encouraged opportunistic behavior by both investors and corporate managers. This 
sometimes reckless expansion can result in failure and an over-dependence on financial 
leverage leading to exploitation of minority investors. Therefore it is important that a ro- 
bust system of governance is in place, particularly in the areas of corporate management, 
equity trading and foreign investment if the Taiwanese successful story is to continue. This 
paper examines links between family control and performance in firms operating in a single 
legal and institutional environment, and permits us to hold constant a number of impor- 
tant contextual factors. This avoids endogeneity problems between ownership structure and 
country-specific institutional characteristics (Carney & Gedajlovic, 2002; Joh, 2003). 
The Taiwanese corporate sector represents an important research laboratory that provides 
an opportunity to develop further previous research and to make a number of contributions. 
First, it allows us to analyze corporate governance effects on performance in situations 
where the managers are frequently family members, where families are also represented on 
a firm’s board, and where they are often the major providers of capital, if not directly, then 
through relational holdings in other firms (Bruton et al., 2003; Carney & Gedajlovoc, 2003). 
At the same time, family-controlled firms that are listed on the stock exchange also have 
minority shareholders to whom managers are accountable, and the governance effects of 
the interaction of family control with external share ownership on performance is therefore 
an important research issue. Second, the process of maturity and globalization of Taiwanese 
capital markets is accompanied by an increase in importance of institutional investors, both 
  
domestic and foreign. Building on an integrated research framework developed by Agrawal 
and Knoeber (1996) and Aderson and Reeb (2003), this paper examines the extent to which 
concentrated shareholdings by institutions can influence firm performance, similarly with 
non-family representation on corporate boards. Finally, an improvement in reporting and 
disclosure standards in Taiwan presents an opportunity for a relatively rigorous empirical 
study using firm-level data. This paper provides an analysis of governance-performance 
relationships using a multi-industry dataset of 228 firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange 
(TSE), while taking account of possible endogeneity problems. 
The paper begins with a discussion of the institutional structures in Taiwan, with particular 
emphasis on the custom and practice of family ownership and the regulatory system of board 
membership and control. Section two outlines the literature on which the examination of 
the role of corporate governance in firm performance is based and develops a number 
of research hypotheses. The next section briefly describes the data used in the empirical 
analysis, followed by the results and a discussion of the findings. The final section concludes. 
 
 
The institutional framework of corporate governance in Taiwan 
 
The legal framework of corporate governance in Taiwan is based both on Company Law, 
which defines the contractual relationship between management and the providers of capital, 
and Securities and Exchange Law that is directed towards more widely held publicly-traded 
companies to ensure adequate disclosure and transparency necessary for efficient financial 
market operations. The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) is the market regulator for 
the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE), with responsibility for issuing new securities, ensuring 
timely disclosure of company financial information and regulating market intermediaries, 
trading and settlement. Taiwanese companies operate with a board of directors and a number 
of supervisors, similar to that in Japan, although there are a number of differences. According 
to Company Law (provision 192), the board should be composed of a minimum of three 
directors who have a responsibility to maintain the value of the firm and ensure good 
practice in terms of audit, transparency and accountability. Directors are formally elected 
at the general meeting of shareholders, and they usually nominate a CEO and/or Board 
Chairman. To be confirmed in these top positions requires support of at least half the 
executive directors. 
The Company Law (sections 216–227) also specifies that Taiwanese companies should 
have supervisors, much as the Japanese kansayaku. However, the supervisors in Taiwan 
are explicitly defined not as a board but as individuals that take responsibility for indepen- 
dent monitoring. They do not meet and act as a board, and there is no minimum number 
specified. Before the general meeting of shareholders, significant shareholders normally ne- 
gotiate amongst themselves to select the list of directors and supervisors, and the outcome 
of this bargaining process very much depends on family networks and contacts. On rare 
occasions when consensus cannot be achieved, significant shareholders prepare an election 
campaign and try to secure proxy votes of minority investors. 
Board organisation and functions in Taiwan are clearly a departure from not only the 
US and UK, but also from Japan and neighbouring Hong Kong and Singapore. Alternative 
single boards models rely on non-executive directors to undertake a monitoring role, with 
 
 
 
the discipline of the market providing a robust controlling mechanism (e.g., Arthur, 2001; 
Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Golden & Zajac, 2001). However, the system in Taiwan does 
not resemble formal two-tier systems either. For example, France and Germany ensure 
effective monitoring by common consensus of the supervisory board, which has wide powers 
of scrutiny with respect to management and the right to select and remove members of 
the board of directors (Zeckhauser & Pound, 1990). This can be the responsibility of a 
single supervisor in Taiwan. Another aspect of board composition that separates governance 
models in Taiwan and Japan from other countries is the lack of any formal representation 
from labor. Finally, the family owners have a great deal of discretion in terms of board 
appointments and leadership structure. 
Mandatory equity ownership by directors and supervisors in listed companies in Taiwan 
is a further factor that differentiates Taiwanese corporate governance from not only con- 
ventional US/UK model but also other SEA countries. In order to align directors’ interests 
with maintaining the objective of contributing to corporate value, the market regulator sets 
a minimum shareholding associated with all members of the Board of Directors and the 
supervisors, ensuring that no outsider is formally required to be part of the governance 
system (see Table 1). This is now beginning to change, but extremely slowly. 
Companies are required to report trading activity by board members, supervisors and 
any other shareholders with more than 10% of equity in the firm to the SFC. In particular, 
the SFC is interested in any change in the amount of collateralized equity in the firm. This 
appears to be peculiar to the Taiwanese corporate sector and does not exist in other systems 
of shareholder-based corporate governance. 
Taiwan has achieved an advanced level of economic development, but there is still ev- 
idence of an emerging entrepreneurial capitalism and in many cases, firms retain family 
ownership and control. Even in publicly traded companies with minimal shareholding by 
founding families, there is the perception of family ownership and thus the approach to 
corporate governance is confused. As a consequence, there is a close relationship between 
the board of directors and the supervisors in the vast majority of Taiwanese firms. Wealth 
Magazine (2002) found that five leading manufacturing companies, including the largest 
listed on the TSE, had a husband and wife in the role of board chairman and supervisor, 
respectively, weakening the monitoring system altogether. This has highlighted the need 
for a further examination of the structure of corporate governance overall, where family 
ownership and control can be so distortionary. 
 
 
 
Table 1.   Statutory shareholding for officers in listed companies. 
 
Minimum required shareholding 
 
Firm capitalisation (New Taiwanese $) Board of directors (%) Supervisors (%) 
 
<300 mil NT$ 15 1.5 
300 mil NT$–1000 mil NT$ 10 1.0 
1000 mil NT$–2000 mil NT$ 7.5 0.75 
>2000 mil NT$ 5.0 0.5 
 
 
 
Theoretical background and research hypotheses 
 
The effect of family owners on corporate performance 
 
Few empirical studies consider organisational performance of publicly owned, family con- 
trolled firms directly, although Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) confirms that a large 
proportion of listed companies are still under family control in a number of countries in 
East Asia, including Taiwan. Further, more than two-thirds of listed firms in East Asian 
countries are controlled by a single shareholder with 60% of managers in these companies 
members of the family of the controlling shareholder. Clearly, this is the common model 
of corporate governance in the region (Bruton et al., 2003). At the same time, corporate 
control in East Asia is largely dependent on a pyramid ownership structure with equity 
cross-holding amongst associated firms making the separation of ownership and control 
very unlikely. Furthermore, not only is this model of governance prevalent in small and 
medium sized enterprises, it is also replicated in large scale public trading companies in 
Taiwan, as well as in Korea and Singapore. 
In an attempt to explain this phenomenon, La Porta et al. (1999) claim the popularity of 
family controlled companies results from inadequate protection of investor rights by national 
institutions. In a survey of large corporations in 27 high per capita income countries, only 
those with high levels of investor rights protection exerted adequate monitoring of the few 
firms that were controlled by single shareholders or a dominant family. Claessens et al. 
(2000) in a study of East Asian countries indicate that controlling families generally use 
pyramidal ownership structures to ensure a disproportionately high level of controlling 
rights as well as cash flow rights. 
A number of researchers express concerns about the problems associated with family 
control, and the increased likelihood of the abuse of managerial power. Research from North 
America in particular, (e.g. Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988, Smith & Amoako-Adu, 1999) 
provides evidence of the negative effect of a controlling family on corporate performance. In 
addition, strategy research identifies family firms to be altruistic in the relationship between 
parents and their children (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001), which may have 
an impact on the effective succession process when the founder retires. Moreover, family 
interest may dominate over the interest of non-family shareholders, since the concentration 
of personal and family wealth in owner-managed firms normally creates a preference for 
income and for wealth preservation over other dimensions of firm performance such as 
maximisation of dividend payments to outside shareholders (Carney & Gedajlovic, 2003). 
Finally, family control tends to shield a firm from the disciplinary pressure of the market for 
corporate control since concentrated share ownership reduces the probability of a hostile 
take-over (Gomez-Mejia, 2003) 
However, whether families or professional managers run companies better for society in 
general is still open to debate. During the current prolonged recession, corporate scandals 
and the collapse of stock markets have resulted in a return to the kind of values prevalent 
in family-owned companies. Family businesses that survived their own internal succession 
dramas have tended to take a longer-term view rather than live and die by stock market 
evaluation of their performance (Bruton et al., 2003). Because of the extension of altruism 
  
 
from the family system to the firm, owners in the current generation have the tendency and 
obligation to reserve wealth for the next generation. As a result, family firms often possess 
longer horizons compared to non-family firms (James, 1999). Family firms, therefore, repre- 
sent a special class of large shareholders that may have a unique incentive structure, a strong 
voice in the firm, and powerful motivation of managers (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). Anderson 
et al. (2003) suggest that these characteristics can alleviate agency conflicts between the 
firms’ debt and equity claimants and reduce the agency costs of debt. Because the family’s 
wealth is so closely linked to firm welfare, families may have strong incentives to mon- 
itor managers and minimize the free-riding problem inherent with diffused shareholders. 
If monitoring requires knowledge and information about firm technology and processes, 
families potentially provide superior oversight because of their lengthy involvement with 
the firm (Anderson & Reeb, 2003: 1305). 
Studies on emerging economies have developed this research further and uncovered 
other important institutional factors that may contribute to governance outcomes of family 
control, such as the development of market institutions, the level of government involvement, 
industry structures, and enforcement of business laws (Chang & Hong, 2000; Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997, 2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; North, 1994). 
For example, Filatotchev et al. (2000) indicate that managerial opportunism in transition 
economies is not controlled effectively by new owners of the privatized firm, arguing that 
their monitoring is constrained by difficulties in gaining board seats in employee dominated 
firms, by weak legal enforcement, weak external capital market forces and volatile product 
markets. This leads to the suggestions that family ownership can create a counter-balance to 
a fluid state of the institutional environment in emerging market economies and the retention 
of control by founding families may be positively associated with performance outcomes 
(Newman, 2000). 
In addition, strategy analysis of corporate governance (Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002) views 
family control as less of a problem as it could be a potential provider of more useful resources 
and a possible enhancement of firm value. In fact, La Porta and Lopez-De-Silanes (1997) 
find that poorer investor protection by national legal systems is associated with smaller and 
more illiquid capital markets supporting the view that private finance could be vital and a 
scarce resource for corporate growth in these countries. In economies with immature capital 
markets and few professional managers, many family firms are established by obtaining cap- 
ital and human investments from families and personal networks (McConaughy, Matthews, 
& Fialko, 2001). Furthermore, through business networks, uncertainties and complexity 
are reduced because information is shared and circulated among the participants in the 
network, resulting in better monitoring of activities both within and between firms. This 
is especially effective in East Asia as financing is relationship-based, and the presence of 
owners in family-controlled firms should be associated with better growth and higher firm 
value. 
These arguments suggest that family ownership can lead to better monitoring of manage- 
rial discretion and reduce principal-agent costs associated with diffused share ownership 
structures. It can also facilitate access to resources. As a result, family presence in the 
firm may provide a competitive advantage and improve short- and long-term performance 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003). A number of more recent empirical studies provide evidence that 
 
 
 
controlling family ownership is associated with better performance in South Korea (Chang, 
2003; Joh, 2003) and Hong Kong (Carney & Gedajlovic, 2002). Building on the agency and 
institutional analyses of performance effects of family ownership and control, we suggest: 
H.1. In Taiwan, family ownership and control are positively associated with perfor- 
mance. 
 
 
Institutional investors and corporate performance 
 
The above arguments suggest that, other things being equal, family control over the firm 
may be associated with superior oversight and strong incentives to monitor managers that 
should mitigate principal-agent costs. However, when organizations grow, the limited fi- 
nancial and managerial resources of a founding family impose constraints on development. 
Although family control may be a way to resolve agency problems, the lack of owner sup- 
port for new investment results in the need to access capital market funding and increasing 
importance of attracting external, non-family shareholders. Families can seek to maximize 
firm performance but yet still create severe conflicts over the distribution of wealth among 
different groups of shareholders (Anderson & Reeb, 2004). As a result, the primary agency 
problem in this environment is not the failure of professional managers to satisfy the ob- 
jectives of diffused shareholders, but rather the expropriation of minority shareholders by 
the family interests (Bruton et al., 2003; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny 
2000a), what Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, and Bruton (2002) call a “principal-principal” or 
“horizontal” agency relationship. The potential for moral hazard conflict between the fam- 
ily and outside shareholders creates a new set of agency costs, including mutual monitoring 
and opportunity costs, that may have an adverse effect on the firm. Therefore, divestments 
through sales of large blocks of shares to institutional investors may be a viable alternative 
to ownership dispersion from the minority shareholders point of view (Hansmann, 1996; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
A number of studies in the US suggest that large block outside ownership may have a 
positive impact on firm performance. Companies may have large groups of undiversified 
shareholders that play a critical leadership and monitoring role. They have both the in- 
centives and the means to restrain the self-serving behaviour of managers (Maug, 1998; 
Zeckhauser & Pound, 1990). For example, using structural equation modelling, Hoskisson 
et al. (1994) showed that block shareholders may not allow a poor strategy such as diversifi- 
cation to evolve into poor performance, therefore decreasing the magnitude of restructuring. 
Wruck (1989) provides empirical evidence that when managers have an opportunity to con- 
duct a self-serving deal that damages shareholders, the decision to sell a block of securities 
to non-management investors increases shareholder wealth. Finally, the study by McConnel 
and Servaes (1990) suggests a positive relationship between institutional share ownership 
and Tobin’s Q. However, this research is focused on the governance roles of large block 
outside investors in reducing costs associated with “vertical” principal-agent relationship 
problem, and their impact on “horizontal”, principal-principal agency relationship is not 
well understood. 
Institutional aspects of corporate governance in Taiwan bring new and interesting di- 
mensions to this debate. Investment opportunities in the Taiwanese capital markets have 
 
 
 
increasingly attracted both domestic and overseas investors. However, the relatively illiquid 
capital market provides an effective constraint on institutional investors’ ability to create 
and manage a risk-free portfolio. At the same time, institutional investors acquire shares in 
listed firms that also have a substantial family block-holding (Bruton et al., 2003). Anderson 
and Reeb (2003, 2004) suggest that when families are in exceptional control positions, the 
presence of large external investors can mitigate the potential for moral hazard conflict 
between the family and outside shareholders. In addition, when control is dissipated among 
several large investors, a decision to expropriate minority shareholders requires the con- 
sent of a coalition of investors, and this coalition might hold enough cash flow rights to 
choose to limit expropriation of the remaining shareholders and pay the profits as efficient 
dividends (La Porta et al., 2000a). In this particular case, an entrenchment effect associated 
with individual shareholdings of the coalition’s members may be dominated by the Jensen- 
Meckling incentives generated by the combined coalition’s share ownership. For example, 
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) suggest a theoretical model explaining an alignment ef- 
fect of a coalition of large shareholders, that is a positive relation between the cash flow 
stake of the controlling coalition and total firm value. Therefore, in Taiwan, presence of 
institutional investors may be complementary to family control in terms of its positive ef- 
fects on firm performance (Gomes-Mejia et al., 2003) and it can mitigate agency costs of 
what Young et al. (2002) call a “principal-principal” agency relationship. Building on this 
research, we suggest that: 
 
 
H.2. In Taiwan, the share ownership of outside institutional investors is positively 
associated with performance. 
 
 
Most research on performance effects of institutional share ownership, however, has not 
differentiated among types of investors (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002). Only 
recently have studies acknowledged that the identity of such owners has important organi- 
zational implications because different owners may have different objectives and decision- 
making horizons (Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 2003: 197). For example, banks and 
investment trusts may behave differently in terms of their strategic preferences (see Chang, 
2003; McConnell & Servaes, 1990, for a discussion). Some authors (e.g., Brickley, Lease, 
& Smith, 1988; Kochar & David, 1996) differentiate between “pressure-resistant” and 
“pressure-sensitive” institutional investors. Pressure-resistant institutions, such as invest- 
ment funds, are unlikely to have strong business links with their investors, and they may have 
stronger influence on strategy choices and their performance outcomes (Hoskisson et al., 
2002). Johnson and Greening (1999) also indicate that investment fund managers’ objective 
is a high relative performance of their portfolio firms because of their own reward system. 
On the other hand, “pressure-sensitive” investors such as banks are likely to have business 
relationships with the firms in which they invest (Kroszner & Strahan, 2001). Because 
they often have an obligation to support the management’s agenda, their governance role 
tends to be more passive compared to “activist” investors (Tihaniy et al., 2003). Previous 
research widely acknowledged overlapping long-term business and investment relation- 
ships between banks and industrial companies in East Asia and their potentially detrimental 
effects on performance (Bruton et al., 2003; Chang & Hong, 2000; Mitton, 2002). 
 
 
 
In addition, a number of studies in the international business field recognise that foreign 
institutional investors are more likely to produce positive performance effects on the local 
firm than domestic institutions, in particular in emerging market economies. For example, 
foreign investors based in developed market economies may provide local firms in their 
portfolio with access to a larger, global pool of financial resources compared to domes- 
tic institutions that mainly operate in the national capital markets (Taylor, 1990). Foreign 
investors may have a wealth of experience dealing with managerial opportunism and asso- 
ciated principal-agent problems in various national and cultural settings. This may make 
them better and more experienced monitors than domestically-oriented investors (Thomsen 
& Pedersen, 2000). In addition, different investment preferences held by foreign institu- 
tional investors combined with their global investment experience may provide their investor 
firms with access to strategic expertise and knowledge that help them to gain a competitive 
edge compared to companies funded by domestic investors, especially when expanding 
internationally (Tihanyi et al., 2003). Following the increasingly international activity of 
the Taiwan Stock Exchange in the early 1990s foreign financial institutions are increas- 
ingly investing in Taiwanese listed firms, and domestic and foreign institutions may have a 
different impact on local firms. 
Building on this research, we suggest: 
 
 
H.3a. In Taiwan, the share ownership of foreign institutional investors has a stronger, 
positive association with performance than does ownership of domestic financial 
institutions. 
 
H.3b. In Taiwan, the share ownership of investment funds has a stronger, positive 
association with performance than does ownership of banks. 
 
 
 
The governance effect of boards 
 
The previous discussion links firm’s performance with the presence of large-block share- 
holders, such as family owners and outside institutional investors. However, this combina- 
tion of different large-block holders may create its own problems. For example, cultivating 
trust between insiders and outsiders in a family-controlled business is difficult as owners are 
reluctant to share information they consider proprietary (Schulze et al., 2001). Paternalism 
also contributes to the highly centralised decision-making structure, concentrating power 
and control among people with family links to the owners of family firms (Daily & Dalton, 
1992). Having the initial human capital deriving from family members, there is a tendency 
for owners’ entrenchment as managers in their firms (Gomes-Mejia et al., 2003 Gomes- 
Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, & Guttierrez, 2001). Although family and institutional ownership 
concentration overcomes some of the agency costs associated with lack of legal protection 
of minority shareholders, other, complementary governance mechanisms are needed to deal 
with possible entrenchment of dominant owners (Anderson & Reeb, 2003, 2004; Rediker 
& Seth, 1995). In this section, we focus on governance and strategy functions of boards in 
Taiwanese firms. 
 
 
 
Corporate governance research and organization studies increasingly recognise that 
boards of directors have a central role in reducing agency problems, and board structure and 
characteristics may influence strategic choices (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). The resource depen- 
dence and strategic change perspectives have suggested that, in addition to control functions, 
the board may also play service/resource and strategic roles in the decision-making process 
(Pfeffer, 1972; Daily, Johnson, & Dalton, 1999). Effective monitoring and service roles are 
usually a function of structural factors such as the proportion of independent directors on 
the board, CEO/Chairman roles held jointly or separately, etc. (Daily et al., 1999; Zahra 
& Pearce, 1989; Young, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Chan, 2001). Finally, institutional theorists 
suggest that board independence may be used as a signalling device by organizations that 
act to enhance or protect their legitimacy, especially in the investor community (North, 
1990; Peng, 2004). 
A number of studies try to link board characteristics directly to firm performance. 
Brickley, Coles, J., and Terry (1994) discuss the governance impact of alternative board 
composition by examining whether boards with a higher percentage of independent mem- 
bers from outside the firm are associated with greater valuation. Similarly, Xie, Davidson III, 
& DaDalt (2002) test the effect of independent boards of directors in preventing the manip- 
ulation of earnings statements. Results suggest that independent board and audit members, 
especially those with appropriate areas of expertise, effectively lower the discretionary cur- 
rent accruals shown in corporate financial reports. However, there is a paucity of studies of 
governance effects of corporate boards outside the US. For example, Authur (2001) uses 
135 firms from the Australian Stock Exchange in 1989 and Mak and Li (2001) use 147 
Singaporean listed companies, both of which find empirical support for the view that man- 
agerial influence can bias board composition towards appointing board members that are 
allies of the CEO. In his study of boards of the largest firms in China Peng (2004) documents 
a positive relationship between presence of independent directors and firm performance. 
Specific characteristics of corporate boards in large Taiwanese firms bring new and in- 
teresting dimensions to this research on governance roles of boards. Existing studies on 
corporate governance in family-controlled firms in South and East Asia and our account of 
institutional aspects of corporate sector in Taiwan provided above suggest that family mem- 
bers dominate the boards of directors (Bruton et al., 2003; Young et al., 2001). Management 
is exercised through a senior owner-manager who typically assumes the presidency of the 
firm and concurrently holds the top executive position and therefore, has complete control 
of the firm and its decisions (Carney & Gadajlovic, 2003). In this environment, agency 
analysis of performance outcomes of board independence from the CEO and other exec- 
utives that dominated research in the USA and other developed economies becomes less 
relevant. Instead, research focus shifts towards studying organizational outcomes of direc- 
tors’ independence from controlling families (Carney & Gadajlovic, 2002; Gomes-Mejia 
et al., 2003). 
On one hand, our previous arguments suggest that, in Taiwan, family control may be 
associated with better performance. Therefore, the appointment of ‘controllers’ that are 
related to the largest family may re-enforce positive effects of family ownership. On the 
other hand, this family control over boards may lead to greater executive entrenchment and 
potential conflicts with outside investors, in particular with institutional shareholders whose 
 
 
 
strategy preferences may differ from the family interests (Anderson et al., 2003; Gomez- 
Mejia et al., 2001). For example, Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino (2003) suggest that altruism 
can bias the CEOs’ perceptions of their relatives employed on the board, which hampers 
their ability to monitor and discipline them. Wiseman and Gomes-Mejia (1998) argue that 
family-related directors face higher exit costs because leaving the firm would mean forgoing 
certain rights, perquisites and privileges associated with being part of the controlling family. 
These high exit costs translate into a higher level of entrenchment. Given an emphasis in 
the literature on the links between controlling coalitions of large block shareholders and the 
effectiveness of the board, it is possible to suggest that non-family directors may have an 
important governance role that is complementary to monitoring by large-block holders in 
terms of reconciling potentially different interests of the family and outside investors and 
leading to more efficient organizational outcomes. 
In addition to the agency approach to the roles of corporate boards, Peng (2004) and Young 
et al. (2001) develop resource-based and institutional arguments suggesting that non-family 
directors may have positive effect on performance in emerging markets. Bearing in mind 
the importance of networks in South and East Asian economies, non-family directors may 
provide additional external ties that can be used to access resources and knowledge that 
are more diverse than resources of the controlling family (Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002). 
In addition, new organizational practices, including appointing outside directors, represent 
important means to enhance or protect organizational legitimacy and to keep up with com- 
petition (Peng, 2004: 458). These resource and institutional arguments suggest that presence 
of non-family directors improve competitive position of the firm. Thus: 
 
H.4. In Taiwan, the extent of board independence from the controlling families is 
positively associated with performance. 
 
Finally, mandatory share ownership of board members in Taiwan provides a unique opportu- 
nity to analyse performance outcomes of directors’ financial interest beyond the traditional 
research focus of the possible effects of equity-based incentives in the West. Although in- 
dependent directors may provide a particularly important strategic contribution by a direct 
involvement in developing strategy, the research literature on corporate boards suggests 
that board involvement in policy-making is often passive, and it relies mainly on financial 
outcomes of strategic decisions of the CEO (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Golden & Zajac, 
2001). However, when an organization encounters uncertain environmental conditions, or 
is in its growth phase, the board of directors needs to be more pro-active in terms of its 
involvement in decision-making. The board should also be able to shift emphasis from fi- 
nancial control and evaluation of managerial decisions to strategic control more focused on 
longer-term organizational outcomes (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). Therefore, indepen- 
dent directors need to have strong incentives to perform monitoring, resource and service 
functions effectively. 
Previous research links close involvement in strategy development and implementation 
with the personal financial risk approximated by ownership interests in the firm (Oswald 
& Jahera, 1991; Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999). Geletkanycz, Boyd, and Finkelstein (2001) 
associate board ownership with strategic power, whereas Hambrick and Jackson (2000) 
indicate that share ownership not only creates financial incentives for independent directors 
 
 
 
but also increases their identification with the company, making them more vigilant in their 
oversight and more generous in their time and attention. Bearing in mind the mandatory 
requirement for board members to hold shares in listed firms in Taiwan, it is possible to sug- 
gest that these financial incentives may have a particularly strong effect in terms of aligning 
interests of families and external minority shareholders. These arguments imply that: 
 
H5. In Taiwan, board members’ share ownership is positively associated with perfor- 
mance. 
 
 
Data and methodology 
 
Sample 
 
To test these hypotheses, data on all companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange in 
1999 was compiled. Of these, 25 financial institutions were excluded following common 
practice in the literature, (see, for example, Shivdasani & Yermack (1999), Faccio & Lasfer 
(2001), Kroszner & Strahan (2001), Mitton (2002) and Singh and Davidson (2002)) given 
the nature of corporate governance in financial institutions differs from that in non-financial 
firms. The final sample is 228 public trading companies, distributed across the industry 
sectors as follows: Textiles (54), Construction (40), Electrical (54) and Services (36). The 
residual 44 companies are from the remaining sectors. All data were taken from reports 
submitted to the SFC. 
 
 
Measures 
 
Variables used are in four main groups: family and institutional ownership, board charac- 
teristics, measures of firm performance and control variables. Data on ownership is central 
to this study, and were obtained from the SFC. The use of ownership structure as a proxy 
for corporate governance varies considerably in the literature. Common to much research is 
a focus on the governance effect of management shareholding, generally using ownership 
with respect to board members (for example, Arthur, 2001; Mak & Li, 2001), to the CEO 
(for example, Core, Holthausen, & Lacker, 1999; Zhou, 2001), and to senior management, 
including managers and directors (for example, Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 1999; Han- 
son and Song, 2000). However, given that large shareholders may be critical in studies of 
corporate governance, some authors specifically use the holdings of dominant shareholders 
as the ownership variable and test its effect on corporate value (for example, Demsetz, & 
Lehn, 1985; Ang, Cole, & Lin, 2000). Finally, others use a measure of outside block-holders 
as a proxy for the degree of monitoring activity (for example, Faccio, & Lasfer, 2000; Singh, 
& Davidson, 2002). 
Given the high concentration of family owned firms in Taiwan, the measure of ownership 
is defined as the equity holding of the largest individual shareholder and close family. 
Following Claessens et al. (2000) and Chang (2003) the membership of the controlling 
family is identified by linking corporate insiders including CEO, board chairman, honorary 
chairman and vice chairman of the company that share a common family name with the 
 
 
 
largest owner. However, the five most common Chinese family names, Lin, Li, Chen, Chang 
and Wang, are also common in Taiwan and so this is not a sufficiently stringent criterion. 
Thus, family membership is identified as having one of these five names plus the first name 
of the largest shareholder from the male side of the family. Having identified the family 
of the largest shareholder, we investigate the shareholding of every individual member and 
sum these to define the total ownership of each family. 
To capture the governance effect of different external block-holders, institutional investors 
are divided into financial institutions and non-financial corporate investors. Assuming that 
domestic and foreign institutions may have a different impact on monitoring activity, they are 
treated separately. Further, even amongst financial institutions, banks and investment trusts 
may behave differently, and these are also considered separately. In Taiwan, corporations 
are also among important institutional shareholders, and their share ownership needs to be 
controlled for. Thus, in addition to family ownership, we use five institutional ownership 
variables: domestic and foreign banks and domestic and foreign investment trusts and 
corporations. 
Several variables are used to measure board characteristics, such as composition, size, 
shareholding and leadership. In terms of board composition, previous studies differentiate 
between “insider” directors (e.g., current and retired firm employees, their family members, 
etc.), “affiliate” directors (e.g., non-employee board members with business ties to the 
firm) and “independent” directors whose relations with the firm is restricted to their board 
membership only (see Anderson & Reeb, 2004, for a discussion). However, in this study 
we are focused on the organizational outcomes of board members’ direct family links with 
family-owners. Therefore, board independence from the family was operationalised using 
three variables. A dummy variable Independent Chairman denotes that the chairman is 
not from the family with the largest shareholding. In addition, % Directors/Family and 
% Supervisors/Family are the percentages of total seats on the board of directors and the 
supervisors that is controlled by any relative of the firms’ largest family owner, or any 
organization controlled by the member of this family, respectively. Board Share Holding is 
the total shareholding of the board of directors plus the supervisors. 
A number of measures of firm performance are used in this study. The ratio of market 
to book value (MTBV) is the most common measure in empirical corporate governance 
research (see for example, Morck et al., 1988; McConnell, & Servaes, 1990; Cho, 1998; 
Himmelberg et al., 1999). However, according to Chang, & Hong (2000) a significant 
herding effect is found in Taiwan, and therefore pricing on the TSE is not fully efficient 
and may not sufficiently reflect the true value of the firm. Thus, two accounting measures 
are used here in addition to book-to-market ratio which have been widely used in previous 
research (see Demsetz, & Lehn, 1985; Ang et al., 2000): 
 
 
Return on capital employed (ROCE) = Profit before Tax/Total Issued Capital 
Return on assets (ROA) = Profit before Interest/Total Assets 
 
 
In addition to these accounting ratios, we used two capital and product market-based perfor- 
mance proxies. These measurements were sales revenue as the percentage of issued capital 
  
 
(STIC) and earning per share (EPS). The later was calculated as 
 
EPS = (Profits after Tax-Dividend Paid on Preference Shares)/Total Issued Shares 
 
Control variables were used to account for industry effects and resource allocation fac- 
tors. Industry dummies represent the four industrial categories: Textiles (clothes, natural 
and synthetic fibres, and plastic material), Construction (the construction industry plus ma- 
terial providers including cement, glass, and steel), Electrical (electrical machinery, electri- 
cal appliance, & cables, computers and semiconductors) and Services (transport, tourism, 
wholesale and retail trading), with firms from the remaining industries used as control. 
Other controls include the logarithm of capital intensity ratio, the logarithm of number of 
employees, the logarithm of age of the firm, the gearing ratio, the profit margin and a dummy 
variable that defines whether the firm is a member of a bigger group and zero otherwise. 
Previous research on corporate governance effects on performance in emerging markets 
provides justification for inclusion of these control variables (see Bruton et al., 2003; Car- 
ney, & Gedajlovic, 2003; Chang, & Hong, 2003; Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 2000, 
for a discussion). Our analysis of board effects on performance also included as controls the 
logarithms of the size of the board of directors and the number of supervisors respectively. 
Modelling the relationship between corporate governance factors and productivity has 
generally been approached through standard econometric techniques, such as regression 
analysis. The real problem revolves around the issue of endogeneity, and much of the 
robustness testing in this study is concerned with statistical procedures that investigate the 
existence of endogenous variables and correcting for this where it is found. This concern is 
noted in the literature (Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz, & Lehn, 1985; Cho, 1998). 
To address endogeneity problems we used two-stage least squared regression analysis 
and instrumental variables. To test for endogeneity in the model, the method of Gener- 
alised Instrumental Variable Estimation (GIVE) is used. Firstly, each of the potentially 
endogenous variables is individually regressed on a set of available instruments and the 
truly exogenous variables in the model. These represent a series of single reduced form 
or artificial equations, where the instruments are one and two period lagged values of the 
potentially endogenous variables. Then, the Wu-Hausman procedure is used to identify 
which variables are endogenous, correcting with the instruments where required. Finally, 
the Sargan-Basmann test provides a measure of the adequacy and effectiveness of these 
instrumental variables to solve the problem (see Chang, 2003, for a detailed discussion of 
this methodology). 
 
 
Results 
 
Table 2 provides the correlation matrix and descriptive statistics for the variables used in 
this study. In terms of the industry structure of our sample, 23% of companies belong 
to the textile industry, 17% are in construction, 23% are in the electrical and electronics 
industries, and about 16% companies are from the services sector. On average, sample firms 
employ 1330 employees, and the firms are approximately 31 years old. The average level 
of capitalisation of sample firms is NT$ 544 million (approximately US$ 15.5 million). 
 1. Textiles Industry 0.24 0.43    – 
2. Construction 0.18 0.38    −0.25∗∗  – 
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Table 2.   Mean, standard deviation and correlatons. 
 
Varaiables  Mean  S. Dev  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
 
Industry 
3. Electrics  0.24    0.43    −0.31∗∗  −0.25∗∗  – 
Industry 
4. Services Industry  0.16    0.37    −0.24∗∗  −0.20∗∗  −2.24∗∗  – 
5. In Capital-labor ratio   15.36    0.90    −0.03  0.42∗∗  −0.26∗∗  −0.08      – 
6. In Number of 6.58    1.10       0.02     −0.19∗∗      0.26∗∗  −0.10      −0.60      – 
Employee 
7. In Age  3.37    0.35       0.09     −0.01      −0.31∗∗      0.01     −0.03  0.13     – 
8. Bussiness  Group  0.36    0.48       0.11     −0.13∗∗      0.07  0.02  0.04  0.26∗∗  −0.02      – 
Affilation 
9. Gearning Ratio  0.76    0.48    −0.09  0.16∗       0.06     −0.07  0.05  0.08  0.07  0.03     – 
10. Profit Margin  5.18  16.63    −0.07      −0.18∗       0.09  0.16∗    −0.18∗∗      0.22∗∗      0.02  0.18∗∗  −0.26∗∗  – 
11. Instititutional 5.34    4.87    −0.08      −0.11  0.29∗∗  −0.09  0.02  0.24∗∗  −0.05  0.20∗∗  −0.07  0.20∗∗  – 
Investors’  Ownership 
12. corporate Ownership   18.63  11.68       0.01  0.10     −0.23∗∗      0.13∗       0.23∗∗  −0.13∗       0.02  0.24∗∗      0.14∗    −0.02      −0.02      – 
13. Family Onwership        17.23  13.00       0.08     −0.09      −0.21∗∗      0.21∗∗  −0.01  0.01  0.06  0.27∗∗  −0.05  0.18∗∗  −0.05  0.23∗∗  – 
14. Indep. Chariman  0.23    0.42    −0.01  0.02  0.16∗    −0.03  0.09  0.02     −0.06  0.04     −0.07  0.06  0.06     −0.05      −0.30∗∗ 
15. In Size Executive  1.98    0.49    −0.01  0.02  0.03     −0.09  0.05  0.29∗∗      0.26∗∗      0.21∗∗      0.05  0.10  0.15∗       0.03     −0.08  0.22∗∗  – 
Board 
16. In size Supervisory         0.61    0.48    −0.12  0.05  0.15∗    −0.13∗       0.08  0.20∗∗      0.06  0.26∗∗  −0.06  0.13  0.21∗∗      0.08     −0.07  0.21∗∗      0.58∗∗  – 
Board 
17. % Directors linked       46.88  27.44       0.15∗    −0.06      −0.30∗∗      0.11  0.06     −0.10  0.15∗       0.03  0.00     −0.02      −0.09  0.17∗       0.45∗∗  −0.42∗∗  −0.31∗∗  −0.25∗∗  – 
to Family 
18. % Supervisors  42.02  40.83       0.20∗∗  −0.04      −0.27∗∗      0.12  0.10     −0.10  0.18∗∗      0.12  0.05     −0.05      −0.04  0.23∗∗      0.44∗∗  −0.22∗∗  −0.17∗    −0.24∗∗      0.62∗∗  – 
linked to Family 
19. Boards’  20.67  12.48    −0.05      −0.06      −0.11  0.28∗∗  −0.07  0.01     −0.08  0.09     −0.08  0.21∗∗  −0.05  0.17∗       0.57∗∗  −0.10  0.00  0.03  0.13  0.17∗    – 
Shareholding 
20. RIA  2.79    7.27    −0.06      −0.12  0.19∗∗  −0.03      −0.06  0.18∗∗  −0.04  0.17∗    −0.19∗∗      0.36∗∗      0.27∗∗  −0.02  0.09  0.07  0.07  0.19∗∗      0.11     −0.04      0.22∗∗       – 
21. ROCE  4.87  18.74    −0.10      −0.10  0.19∗∗      0.01     −0.09  0.18∗∗  −0.06  0.16∗    −0.24∗∗      0.40∗∗      0.29∗∗  −0.04  0.09  0.06  0.06  0.18∗    −0.14∗    −0.09      0.24∗∗  0.92∗∗ 
22. MTBV  0.88    0.98    −0.15∗    −0.20∗∗      0.40∗∗      0.02     −0.18∗∗      0.23∗∗  −0.30∗∗      0.04     −0.10  0.20∗∗      0.34∗∗  −0.11  0.04  0.08     −0.05  0.14∗    −0.20∗    −0.15∗∗  0.14∗∗  0.47∗    0.52∗ 
23. STIC  5.23  10.39    −0.15∗    −0.07  0.13∗       0.00     −0.16∗       0.19∗∗  −0.14∗       0.01     −0.18∗∗      0.25∗∗      0.24∗∗      0.01  0.01     −0.04  0.01  0.13∗    −0.19∗∗      0.10     0.16∗    0.63∗∗  0.70∗∗  0.59∗∗ 
24. EPS  0.55    2.42    −0.08      −0.02         0.16∗    −0.04      −0.02         0.25∗∗  −0.08         0.08     −0.36∗∗      0.42∗∗      0.22∗∗  −0.04         0.00         0.07         0.07         0.19∗∗  −0.12      −0.08      0.26∗∗  0.80∗∗  0.82∗∗  0.49∗∗  0.63∗∗ 
∗∗Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed); ∗Correction is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
 
 
 
In terms of ownership structure, equity stakes of financial institutions and non-financial 
corporate investors are 5.3 and 18.6 percent respectively. On average, controlling families 
hold 17.2% of the firms’ equity, and more than a third of firms are members of wider 
family group networks. The sample characteristics are very close to the findings reported 
by Claessens et al. (2000) for a sample of 120 Taiwanese firms. We also verified the 
distribution of family ownership concentration, and our findings (not reported in Table 2) 
suggest that families with shareholding between 5–15%, 15–25% and 25–35% control 33, 
17.9 and 10.9% of firms in our sample respectively. Finally, almost 11% of companies are 
controlled by families with an equity stake over 35%. Therefore, even compared with other 
Asian countries, the percentage of family controlled companies in Taiwan is extremely high. 
According to Claessens et al. (2000), out of nine Asian countries only Indonesia and South 
Korea have similar levels of family control. In other words, Taiwanese firms represent an 
interesting hybrid of Western and Asian corporate governance models, with a combination 
of family control and minority shareholders. 
In terms of general board characteristics, only 23% of firms in our sample have an 
independent board chairman, that is, someone who is not related to the founding family. 
At the same time, the family shareholders control on average 46.8 and 42.02% of seats 
on executive boards or are supervisors respectively. The average board shareholding in our 
sample is 20.67%. 
Tables 3–5 report results of our formal tests of the stated hypotheses. First, we used 
2SLS analysis to verify ownership effects on performance. According to the Wu-Hausman 
test, our ownership variables should be considered as endogenous, and we replaced direct 
measurements by instruments. Table 3 clearly shows that the combined ownership level of 
financial institutional investors is positively associated with all performance measurements, 
and these results support hypothesis 2. 
As Table 3 indicates, there is no significant effect of the family ownership instrument 
on all measurements of performance. To explore this issue further and test for a possible 
non-linearity in this relationship, we used piecewise linear regressions using three dummies 
for family ownership, having first divided the variable into three intervals, 5–15%, 15–25% 
and 25–35% (see Joh (2003) for a discussion of this methodology). None of these dummies 
had a significant coefficient. Overall, hypothesis 1 is not supported. 
To verify possible differences in governance effects of various types of institutional 
investors (Tihanyi et al., 2003; Hoskisson et al., 2002) we introduced separate ownership 
variables for domestic and foreign banks and investment institutions in the regressions 
reported in Table 4. The results clearly show that positive effects of institutional shareholders 
on performance are mainly driven by investment funds. However, foreign investment banks 
although have positive and significant effect on return on capital and market-to-book ratios. 
The effects of domestic banks are positive but insignificant. These results are in line with 
hypotheses 3a and 3b that suggests different effects of various types of institutional investors 
on performance. 
To verify the robustness of our analysis to the model specification, we used dummies 
for firms controlled by the state, foreign investors and family respectively. To identify the 
controlling shareholder, the largest shareholder was noted first, and if the largest corporate 
shareholder was an organization, an attempt was made to identify the individual owners 
 Textile industry −0.08 
(3.41) 
−0.05 
(1.36) 
−0.06 −5.36∗∗ −0.46 
(0.17)  (1.97)  (0.42) 
−0.06 −1.74 0.73 Construction industry 0.03 −0.03 
 (3.95) (1.57) (0.20) (2.21) (0.47) 
Electric industry 0.10 0.12 0.26∗∗ −1.91 0.25 
 (3.85) (1.53) (0.20) (2.16) (0.46) 
Service industry −0.05 −0.07 0.05 −2.94 −0.41 
 (3.82) (1.52) (0.20) (2.18) (0.47) 
Ln Capital-Labor Ratio 0.00 0.07 0.00 −0.12 −0.07 
 (1.86) (0.74) (0.10) (0.26) (0.06) 
 
(0.08) 
−0.14∗ 
(0.56) 
−0.18∗ 
(0.12) 
−0.02 
(0.18) (0.07) (0.02) 
−0.10 
(0.14) 
−2.47† 
(1.47) 
−0.17 
(0.32) 
−0.08 −2.21∗ −1.14∗∗∗ 
 
 
 
Table 3.   2SLS regression analysis of ownership effects on performance. 
 
ROCE ROA MTBV STIC EPS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ln Number of Employee 0.10 0.13 0.20∗ 2.24∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 
 (1.48) (0.59) 
Ln Age −0.01 0.02 
 (3.46) (1.37) 
Business group affiliation 0.05 0.04 
 (2.66) (1.06) 
Gearing ratio −0.19∗∗ 
(2.46) 
−0.15∗ 
(0.98) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(1.11) 
 
(0.24) 
Profit margin 0.29∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ . 9 0.04† 0.02∗∗∗ 
 (0.07) (0.03) ( .00) ( .02) ( . 0) 
Corporate ownership 0.03 0.05 .01 .  . 1 
 (0.10) (0.04) ( .01) (0.04) ( .01) 
Family ownership IV. 0.07 0.08 .05 0.01 .00 
 (0.09) (0.03) ( . 0) (0.05) (0.01) 
Institutional investors’ ownership IV. 0.18∗∗ 0.16∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 
 (0.23) (0.09) (0.01) (0.08) (0.02) 
Adjusted R square 0.23 0.19 0.26 0.16 0.29 
ANOVA F -value df (13, 214) 6.19∗∗∗ 5.09∗∗∗ 7.30∗∗∗ 4.71∗∗ 8.85∗∗∗ 
Note: All coefficients are standardised; †p  ≤ 0.10; ∗p  ≤ 0.05, ∗∗p  ≤ 0.01; ∗∗∗p  ≤ 0.001; standard errors in 
parentheses; IVs are instrumental variables; ANOVA F-value: Degree of Freedom (Regression, Residual). 
 
 
 
 
 
of that organization. Where these exist, the ultimate owner and family links were checked, 
and family control is defined using the methodology suggested by La Porta et al. (1999) 
and Claessens et al. (2000). If this was not the case, we checked whether the controlling 
organization is a government institute or foreign organization. The regression coefficients 
for the family control dummy were significant in the regressions for accounting measures of 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.   2SLS regression analysis of ownership effects on performance for different categories of institutional 
investors. 
 
ROOE ROA MTBV STIC EPS 
 
Textile industry −0.07 
[3.42] 
−0.04 
[1.36] 
−0.04 
[0.17] 
−5.55∗∗ 
[1.99] 
−0.46 
[0.43] 
Construction industry 0.04 
[3.98] 
−0.01 
[1.59] 
−0.05 
[0.20] 
−1.45 
[2.23] 
0.73 
[0.48] 
Electric industry 0.08 
[3.89] 
0.11 
[1.55] 
0.22∗ 
[0.20] 
−1.70 
[2.19] 
0.25 
[0.47] 
Service industry −0.03 
[3.97] 
−0.05 
[1.58] 
0.08 
[0.20] 
−2.60 
[2.23] 
−0.41 
[0.48] 
Ln Capital—Labor Ratio −0.01 
[1.90] 
0.08 
[0.76] 
−0.01 
[0.10] 
−0.14 
[0.26] 
−0.06 
[0.06] 
Ln Number of Employee 0.09 0.12 0.17∗ 2.21∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 
 [1.49] [0.6] [0.08] [0.56] [0.12] 
Ln Age 0.00 
[3.51] 
0.03 
[1.40] 
−0.14∗ 
[0.18] 
−0.17∗ 
[0.07] 
−0.02 
[0.02] 
Business group affiliation 0.05 
[2.67] 
0.04 
[1.07] 
−0.09 
[0.13] 
−2.53† 
[1.49] 
−0.17 
[0.32] 
Gearing ratio −0.19∗∗ 
[2.47] 
−0.15∗ 
[0.98] 
−0.07 
[0.12] 
−2.23∗ 
[1.11] 
−1.14∗∗∗ 
[0.24] 
Profit margin 0.29∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.08 0.04† 0.02∗∗∗ 
 [0.07] [0.03] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] 
Foreign funds ownership IV. 0.12† 0.08 0.18∗∗ 0.27∗ 0.05∗ 
 [0.41] [0.17] [0.02] [0.12] [0.03] 
Foreign Banks’ Ownership IV. 0.11† 0.08 0.17∗∗ 0.21 0.05 
 [1.09] [0.43] [0.05] [0.23] [0.05] 
Domestic Banks’ Ownership 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.20 0.05 
 [0.38] [0.15] [0.02] [0.21] [0.05] 
Domestic Funds’ Ownership IV. 0.11 0.13† 0.12† 0.51∗ 0.05 
 [0.70] [0.28] [0.04] [0.21] [0.04] 
Corporate Ownership 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.01 
 [0.10] [0.04] [0.01] [0.04] [0.01] 
Family Ownership IV. 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.00 
 [0.09] [0.03] [0.00] [0.05] [0.01] 
Adjusted R square 0.23 0.19 0.29 0.16 0.28 
ANOVA F -value df (16, 211) 5.26∗∗∗ 4.26∗∗∗ 6.70∗∗∗ 3.83∗∗∗ 6.98∗∗∗ 
Note: All coefficients are standardised; †p  ≤ 0.10; ∗p  ≤ 0.05, ∗∗p  ≤ 0.01; ∗∗∗p  ≤ 0.001; standard errors in 
parentheses; IVs are instrumental variables; ANOVA F-value: Degree of Freedom (Regression, Residual). 
  
 
 
Table 5.   OLS regression analysis of board characteristics effects on performance. 
 
ROCE ROA MTBV STIC EPS 
 
Textile industry −0.06 −0.03 0.00 −4.13∗ −0.29 
 (3.12) (1.28) (0.28) (2.02) (0.43) 
Construction industry 0.01 −0.04 −0.15∗ −2.49 0.63 
 (3.52) (1.44) (0.32) (2.23) (0.48) 
Electric industry 0.13 0.13 0.34∗∗∗ −2.18 0.34 
 (3.42) (1.40) (0.31) (2.18) (0.47) 
Service industry −0.02 
(3.48) 
−0.05 
(1.43) 
0.04 
(0.31) 
−2.17 
(2.24) 
−0.55 
(0.48) 
Ln Capital-Labor Ratio 0.14† 0.19∗ 0.16† 0.26 −0.06 
 (1.67) (0.68) (0.15) (0.27) (0.06) 
Ln Number of Employee 0.18∗ 0.20∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 1.90∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 
 (1.35) (0.56) (0.12) (0.57) (0.12) 
Ln Age 0.03 0.04 −0.16∗ −0.15∗ −0.02 
 (3.27) (1.34) (0.29) (0.08) (0.02) 
Business Group Affiliation 0.04 0.04 −0.09 −1.80 −0.17 
 (2.33) (0.96) (0.21) (1.47) (0.31) 
Gearing ratio −0.35∗∗∗ 
(1.70) 
−0.29∗∗∗ 
(0.70) 
−0.03 
(0.15) 
−1.58 
(1.11) 
−1.03∗∗∗ 
(0.24) 
Profit margin 0.30∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.10 0.05∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
Independent chairman −0.07 
(2.66) 
−0.04 
(1.09) 
−0.05 
(0.24) 
−3.86∗ 
(1.72) 
−0.12 
(0.37) 
Ln size executive board −0.10 
(2.82) 
−0.11 
(1.16) 
−0.21∗∗ 
(0.25) 
−0.26 
(0.20) 
−0.01 
(0.04) 
Ln size supervisory board 0.06 0.09 0.17∗ 1.46† 0.20 
 (2.71) (1.11) (0.24) (0.83) (0.18) 
%Directors linked to family −0.18∗ 
(0.05) 
−0.16∗ 
(0.02) 
−0.1 6† 
(0.00) 
−0.11∗∗∗ 
(0.03) 
−0.01 
(0.01) 
%Supervisors linked to family 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
Boards’ Ownership 0.18∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.08 0.08 0.04∗∗ 
 (0.09) (0.04) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) 
Adjusted R square 0.39 0.31 0.31 0.16 0.3 
ANOVA F -value df (16, 211) 9.97∗∗∗ 7.51∗∗∗ 7.27∗∗∗ 3.94∗∗∗ 7.36∗∗∗ 
Note: All coefficients are standardised; †p  ≤ 0.10; ∗p  ≤ 0.05, ∗∗p  ≤ 0.01; ∗∗∗p  ≤ 0.001; standard errors in 
parentheses; ANOVA F -value: Degree of Freedom (Regression, Residual). 
 
 
 
performance. These results indicate that family ownership provides effects on performance 
only in terms of the control threshold, and further research on this issue is needed. 
In further tests we also used interactions between the family control dummy and insti- 
tutional share ownership. Interestingly, an interaction between share ownership of foreign 
institutional investors and the family control dummy provided a positive and highly signif- 
icant effect on performance measurements. This suggests that foreign investors positively 
moderate the effects of family control, which provides some support to our theoretical 
assumptions about possible coalitions among the most important block-holders. 
Finally, Table 5 provides test results with respect to the governance effects of board char- 
acteristics. In terms of board independence variables, an independent chairman provided a 
negative and significant effect on the sales-to-issued capital ratio only. However, the per- 
centage of executive board members associated with the family is negatively related to all 
measurements of corporate performance. In our analysis, we introduced board seats sepa- 
rately for supervisors and executive boards, but the results for supervisors are insignificant 
for performance variables. In other words, family control of the executive board is detri- 
mental for performance, but family-related chairman and supervisors do not seem to have 
effect on performance, and hypothesis 4 is only partially supported. Table 5 also shows that 
board directors’ share ownership is positively associated with three performance proxies, 
in line with hypothesis 5. 
In terms of the possible effects of our control variables, the result of the OLS regressions 
show that the Taiwanese electrical companies are significantly associated with better cor- 
porate performance. By contrast, companies in traditional industries including textiles and 
construction are generally under-performing. Large, younger and capital-intensive firms are 
generally performing better as well. In terms of our financial controls, the level of gearing 
in Taiwanese firms has a negative impact on corporate value and this relation is strongly 
significant at 1% level except in the regressions for the market-to-book variable. Corporate 
profit margins are positively associated with firm value and this positive relation is only 
insignificant in the market-to-book model. Generally, this supports the main assumptions 
of the resource based view that firms with larger resource endowments will perform better 
(Teece, 1980). 
 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
Previous research on the effects of ownership structure and board characteristics on per- 
formance has been predominantly Western, and in particular, an Anglo-American concern. 
However, firms elsewhere, and especially in East Asia, operate with a distinctive culture and 
in different legal and institutional environments, which may have an important impact on 
governance-performance relationships suggested by agency and strategy research. Thus, the 
applicability of the Western models should be tested in different contextual environments, 
and in this paper we have examined inter-relationships between general governance factors 
and firm performance in family-controlled and publicly listed firms in Taiwan. 
Contrary to the assumption of fast growing law and economics research (e.g., Claessens 
et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 2000) we did not find a direct association between 
family ownership and managerial entrenchment and extraction of the private benefits of 
 
 
 
control, which should be detrimental to financial performance. Recent corporate scandals 
such as Enron in the US have provided a new impetus to the debate about whether families 
or professional managers run companies better for society in general. These debates have 
resulted in a growing interest in the importance of the values prevalent in family-owned 
companies (Anderson et al., 2003; Anderson & Reeb, 2003, 2004; Bruton et al., 2003; 
James, 1999). Our results contribute to these debates by providing empirical analysis of 
links between family control and performance in the specific institutional setting of Taiwan. 
Although previous research provides ambiguous results in terms of the possible effects of 
external block-holders on performance (e.g., Maug, 1998; Pound, 1988; Short, 1994), our 
results confirm a positive and significant relationship between institutional share ownership 
and all performance proxies after controlling for possible endogeneity. These results are 
consistent with a block-holder coalition framework that suggests an incentive alignment 
effect of a coalition of large shareholders that reflects a positive relation between the cash 
flow stake of the controlling coalition and total firm value. In other words, the presence 
of institutional investors may provide an effective remedy to a principal-principal agency 
relationship in family-controlled firms (Young et al., 2002), especially in the absence of a 
market for corporate control (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996). 
This paper also supports more recent studies that identify differences in corporate gov- 
ernance effects associated with different types of institutional shareholders. Previous re- 
search recognizes the different governance effects of various types of institutional investors 
(Tihanyi et al., 2003; Hoskisson et al., 2002). In particular, our findings emphasise the im- 
portance of foreign institutional investors in terms of performance outcomes. The process 
of globalization of Taiwanese capital markets may lead to good governance practices being 
imported by domestic firms, and future research on this issue may have very important 
implications for other emerging market economies that want to attract foreign investors. 
However, we did not find consistently significant, positive effects on performance proxies 
of equity held by foreign banks. Because of data limitations we cannot answer the question: 
Do foreign banks own shares for their own investment accounts, or are they holding shares 
on behalf of other institutional investors as custodial banks? If the latter, then the governance 
roles of foreign banks may be limited, and further research on this very important issue is 
in order. 
Our research also provides evidence of selectivity in terms of the effects of various 
board characteristics on firm performance. Although previous research does not generate 
compelling evidence of positive outcomes of board independence (e.g., Brickley et al., 
1994; Xie et al., 2002), our findings suggest that family control over the executive board 
is detrimental to performance. This finding, combined with a lack of evidence of family 
ownership effects on performance, suggests that board dominance may be another channel 
through which families may try to extract the private benefits of control. This aspect may 
develop further law and economics research that is mainly focused on private benefits 
associated with voting rights (La Porta et al., 1998, 2000a). 
Our findings suggest that such an important board characteristic as the presence of an 
independent Chairman does not seem to affect performance. Considering that previous 
research was attempting to associate Chairman independence with more efficient monitoring 
and control of managerial discretion by focusing mainly on publicly owned organizations 
 
 
 
in the West, it is possible that in the context of Taiwan, connections and social capital may 
be of vital importance, and the removal of such an individual may have a negative impact 
on the firm (Bruton et al., 2003). Further research on this very important issue is in order. 
Finally, this study also represents an important step in our understanding of the financial 
dependence perspective (Hambrick & Jackson, 2000) by providing strong evidence of links 
between the financial commitment of the board members and organizational performance. 
Our paper makes a number of theoretical contributions to current corporate governance 
debates. More specifically, previous research has focused on separate organizational out- 
comes of family/insider owners, outside block-holders and board characteristics (Dalton 
et al., 2003; Daily et al., 2003; Gomez-Meija, 2003). Our arguments provide an integrated 
conceptual framework that brings together the analysis of simultaneous performance effects 
of various insider and outside investors, as well as their participation in corporate boards. 
Since alternative control mechanisms exist, an intensive use of one of them should not neces- 
sarily be associated with superior firm performance (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996). Therefore, 
this paper also contributes to previous studies suggesting that one governance channel may 
complement and/or substitute for another (Hoskisson et al., 2002). Rediker and Seth (1995), 
for example, emphasize that firm performance depends on the efficiency of a number of 
governance mechanisms, such as board independence, monitoring by large outside share- 
holders, and incentive effects of directors’ shareholding. However, their research is focused 
on the roles of various governance mechanisms in mitigating principal-agent conflict asso- 
ciated with dispersed share ownership. This paper’s arguments extend Rediker and Seth’s 
analysis by focusing on governance roles of various block-holders, corporate boards and 
board equity interests in the context of an emerging market economy where legal, financial 
and economic institutions are different from the West. Our conceptual framework suggests 
that legal and institutional “voids” (Khanna & Palepu, 1997, 2000) may potentially ag- 
gravate problems associated with a combination of principal-agent and principal-principal 
relationships. In this environment, complementarities between ownership- and board-related 
governance factors may be particularly important. 
This study has several limitations that may suggest a number of avenues for future re- 
search. Firstly, although an initial attempt has been made to take into account possible 
endogeneity of share ownership when examining how large outside shareholders may af- 
fect the performance of Taiwanese firms, the retained share ownership provided a very 
crude measurement of their control. Therefore, a more refined analysis of possible effects 
of different groups of outside investors would be useful. Secondly, our arguments imply a 
positive, linear effect of family ownership on performance. A number of studies suggest that 
ownership concentration creates a trade-off between incentive alignment and entrenchment 
effects (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Therefore, the question of whether family ownership 
hinders or facilitates firm performance becomes an empirical issue that is related to institu- 
tional and politico-regulatory factors (Anderson, & Reeb, 2003). Moreover, the presence of 
this trade-off suggests that the relationship between ownership and firm performance may 
be non-linear. For example, in their study of S&P 500 firms in the US, Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) find that performance is first increasing and then decreasing in ownership, indicating 
that when families have the greatest control of the firm, the potential for entrenchment and 
poor performance is the greatest. These factors combined may explain our non-findings in 
 
 
 
relation of family ownership effects on performance in Taiwan. Although we tried to control 
for non-linearity using piecewise regression analysis, further, more fine-grained analysis is 
in order. Thirdly, our arguments around performance outcomes of family ownership suggest 
that families may have a long-term horizon, and, as a result, different performance measure- 
ments may have different implications for family owners. Similarly, different institutional 
investors may have different time horizons, and, therefore, different preferences in terms 
of short- and long-term performance. Although our use of a wide range of performance 
proxies represents an improvement compared to previous studies in emerging markets 
(Filatotchev et al., 2000; Peng, 2004), an analysis of longer-term performance outcomes of 
different governance mechanisms is in order. Finally, it is important to verify board appoint- 
ment mechanisms that are used by Taiwanese companies. More specifically, since external 
board members may be vetted and approved by the family or other dominant block-holders, 
what is the extent of their independence from the dominant owners? Since our focus was 
on direct, family links between board members and family-owners, we did not account 
for “affiliate” directors, i.e., non-family board members with business ties to the firm. Fu- 
ture analysis of the governance roles of these board members is important, although data 
availability constraints in Taiwan make this research difficult. 
A number of extensions of this research can also be suggested. The increased scrutiny of 
board activities has come from not only academic research but also the regulators and busi- 
ness community. Most of the recommendations emerging from the corporate governance 
debate revolve around such issues as board structure and independence (Golden, & Zajac, 
2001). The findings of this study highlight the value of integrating institutional theory with 
agency research in the analysis of factors affecting board composition and share ownership. 
The next stage should be focused on efficiency outcomes of various combinations of board 
and ownership characteristics (Daily, & Dalton, 1992). In a dynamic perspective, “positions 
of power will flow to groups best able to meet the critical problems and contingencies faced 
by the organization in its environment” (Ocasio, & Kim, 1999: 539). 
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